{"id":248,"date":"2018-10-03T06:41:05","date_gmt":"2018-10-03T13:41:05","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/?p=248"},"modified":"2018-10-03T06:41:05","modified_gmt":"2018-10-03T13:41:05","slug":"is-modal-logic-merely-sophistry","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/2018\/10\/03\/is-modal-logic-merely-sophistry\/","title":{"rendered":"Is Modal Logic Merely Sophistry?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In comments and replies concerning the Ontological Argument, a debate opponent made a claim about controversial rule <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/S5_(modal_logic)\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">S5<\/a> in <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Modal_logic\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Modal Logic<\/a>.  I had been rebutting the fallacies of the Ontological Argument, but he was claiming intellectual high ground with this, so I went to his source, the <a href=\"https:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/a> and read on <a href=\"https:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/logic-modal\/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Modal Logic<\/a>.  It didn&#8217;t seem difficult, so I read quickly through to S5.  I did not see a problem in its formal presentation, but I did with an explanatory example.<\/p>\n<p>I objected on these bases to my correspondent, and he derisively dismissed me, charging that I could not understand these matters so quickly, since he had been studying Modal Logic for many years.  I sent an email to the maintainers of the site, and got an ambivalent reply, and reference to some book.  I also speculated that S5 in Modal Logic had been invented for the purpose of supporting the Ontological Argument, to which my critic accused me of being a biased, ignorant, obstinator, though not in those words.  This morning, in fact-checking myself, I learn that Modal Logic was founded by <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/C._S._Lewis\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">C.S. Lewis<\/a>, a well-known apologist for Theism, and for Christianity, in particular.<\/p>\n<p>Since then, I have been pondering this, off and on, but this morning I synthesized my criticisms into this evaluation: Modal Logic is beset with sophistry.<\/p>\n<p>The first problem I had was with the definition of Modal Logic, or, rather, a resort in justifying or explaining it to a <a href=\"https:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/logic-modal\/#PosWorSem\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Possible Worlds Scenario<\/a>, without defining &#8216;possible&#8217;.  In looking through other resources, I find that &#8216;possible&#8217; is defined as &#8220;existing in some possible world(s)&#8221;.  This is a circular definition, containing the word that is to be defined.  Moreover, the positing of more than one possible world that is not the real world violates the <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Occam%27s_razor\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Principle of Parsimony<\/a>, called Occam&#8217;s Razor.<\/p>\n<p>&#8216;Possible&#8217; means being not self-contradictory.  Some concept, such as a god, in some definition, may be possible if and only if when all effects, all ramifications of the details of the definition are found to not be self-contradictory, to not be impossible.<\/p>\n<p>The phrase &#8216;possible world&#8217; was also not defined, but I intuit that it means &#8216;a set of conditions imagined to be consistent, not self-contradictory&#8217;.<\/p>\n<p>Modal logic also deals with the word &#8216;necessary&#8217;, which is defined as &#8216;existing in all possible worlds, including the real world&#8217;, and with constructions of sequences containing &#8216;necessary&#8217; and &#8216;possible&#8217;.  This inclusion is the biggest invitation to sophistry I can imagine, because to say that something is &#8216;necessarily possible&#8217; or &#8216;possibly necessary&#8217; is sophisticated ambiguity, the first being redundant, and the second being a contradiction in terms.<\/p>\n<p>Since to be &#8216;necessarily possible&#8217; means that in all possible worlds, some proposition is seen as possible.  At best, this means that in no possible, self-consistent set of conditions, can this proposition be seen as impossible.  This is unnecessarily (meaning, &#8216;not needed&#8217;) slamming words together, and multiplying entities, because the only imaginary &#8220;world&#8221; required is the one in which the proposition is not self-contradictory.<\/p>\n<p>To say that something is possible, in the Possible Worlds Scenario, is to confine it to an imagined &#8216;world&#8217;. To then apply &#8216;necessary&#8217; to that something breaks it out of that scope, and requires it to be real.  Why bother having posited it in a &#8220;possible world&#8221; to all?  One ought just admit to assuming reality of the proposed &#8220;something&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p>It seems to me that Modal Logicians are wrapped up in their <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Formalism_(philosophy_of_mathematics)\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">formalism<\/a>, and fail to apply the common meanings to their words enough to realize that, beyond the basics, their work is sophistry.<\/p>\n<p>Views: 213<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In comments and replies concerning the Ontological Argument, a debate opponent made a claim about controversial rule S5 in Modal Logic. I had been rebutting the fallacies of the Ontological Argument, but he was claiming&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[53],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-248","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-modal-logic"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/248","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=248"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/248\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":249,"href":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/248\/revisions\/249"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=248"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=248"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/voland0.xyz\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=248"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}